presented by any single individual cannot be determined with absolute precision, if people are assigned to groups with reasonable accuracy and the total number of insured persons is large, then the estimate of the risk of the entire group of insured people is likely to be accurate.
Traditionally, characteristics of importance for risk classification have included factors such as age, gender, health history, physical condition, occupation, the use of alcohol and tobacco, family history, and serum cholesterol. These factors serve to identify individuals who have a greater or lesser likelihood of premature death or illness in the future. Because of this process, costs are held down for the great majority of insurance applicants since premiums more closely match the risks assumed by the insurance company.
Adverse selection, also known as anti-selection, is a consideration that is of a great importance to insurers. Adverse selection is a well-known phenomenon in which people with a likelihood of loss greater than that which they are charged for tend to apply for or to continue insurance coverage to a greater extent than do other people. It occurs when applicants withhold significant information from the insurer and/or choose amounts and types of insurance that are most beneficial to themselves. For example, someone with a history of heart disease is more likely to apply for insurance and/or to apply for a greater amount of insurance coverage than he would have otherwise done because he knows that he is likely to experience a claim in the foreseeable future. If he fails to mention this important information on his insurance application and the insurer does not otherwise become aware of it, the premium charged by the insurer will be insufficient to cover the risk involved. This premium deficit would be made up by the others in the pool who have paid their fair share.
Adverse selection also occurs if the insurer is not permitted to obtain or to use information that is pertinent to the risk being considered. In the example cited above, the premiums charged would be insufficient to cover the risk involved if the insurer was not permitted to ask the proposed insured and his attending physician about the nature and severity of the heart disease, or if this information could not be used after it had been obtained.
What would happen if the insurance company was unaware of important unfavorable information that was known to the applicants? In these instances, serious errors in risk classification would occur. Certain individuals would receive their insurance at unreasonably low cost. More claims would be filed than were expected, and, if a significant number of these risk classification errors were made, the financial status of the entire insurance pool would be adversely affected.
Nevertheless, couldn't premiums simply be increased across the board in order to cover the payment of these unanticipated benefits? Where permitted, an insurer could increase premiums to reflect these revised claims expectations-but this increase would encourage potential insurance applicants who are at lower risk either to buy from a different seller or to exit the insurance market altogether. Moreover, with the exodus of the lower-risk insured who were subsidizing the individuals who had knowledge of their unfavorable risk status-individuals who had adversely selected against the insurance pool-a further escalation of premiums becomes necessary. More potential applicants then decide not to apply for insurance.
Eventually, a point is reached in this upward spiral where the desired coverage becomes unavailable on any reasonable premium basis or the insurer becomes financially unsound. This "assessment spiral" phenomenon is not a theoretical possibility; it actually occurred in some companies during the 1880s and early 1900s because of poor risk classification practices.
Conceptually, genetic disorders can be divided into two broad groups: (1) diseases with a genetic predisposition, and (2) genetic diseases.
Diseases with a genetic predisposition (or a genetic component) are those in which the presence of a gene confers an increased tendency to develop a certain disorder. The disorder may or may not develop, depending on a variety of associated personal and environmental factors such as geographic location, diet, exposure to harmful chemicals or toxins, exercise, obesity, tobacco use, heavy alcohol ingestion, and so on. A genetic predisposition is often a factor in the development of common impairments such as cancer, coronary heart disease, hypertension, diabetes mellitus, and epilepsy. Together, these disorders are responsible for much of the morbidity and/or mortality that is experienced by the insurance pool.
Genetic diseases are disorders in which the genetic component is so overwhelming that it is expressed in a predictable manner without a requirement for environmental interaction. For example, an individual who inherits the gene for Huntington's disease, cystic fibrosis, or Duchenne muscular dystrophy will eventually develop the disorder regardless of other socioeconomic factors or preventive health measures. Individual genetic diseases are rare compared to diseases with a genetic predisposition, but collectively they are an important cause of morbidity and mortality.
Attending physicians will probably begin to use new diagnostic tests that can identify genetic diseases and diseases with a genetic predisposition shortly after the tests are developed. As mentioned above, insurers have no current interest in ordering such tests themselves. Nonetheless, although they may prefer to avoid ordering genetic tests, it could be extremely important that insurers have access to prior test results. Why? If this information were unavailable to the insurer at the time of underwriting, then applicants who already knew, through tests performed by their attending physicians, that they were likely to experience early death or illness could buy large amounts of insurance coverage at prices that failed to reflect this increased risk. In the aggregate, this practice could involve disproportionately large numbers of applicants and/or highly significant amounts of insurance. The ensuring claims would markedly exceed projected losses, and everyone within the insurance pool would suffer.
Consider the following scenario. Suppose that a man who applies for an individual life or non-cancelable disability insurance policy has had a genetic test performed in the past by his attending physician. Further suppose that the results are unfavorable, i.e., the test suggests a significant likelihood of premature death or disability, and the insurance company does not learn about this result. If no other unfavorable risk factors are known in this case, the policy is issued on a standard class basis.
What has happened? Essentially, the principle of equity has been violated. This applicant with an above-average claim risk has obtained insurance at standard rates. This situation is analogous to that of an older person who misrepresents his true age and obtains insurance at the rates of a much younger person. It is important to note that he has not suddenly become a standard insurance risk because he was issued standard insurance. Rather, he is a substandard risk who has nonetheless obtained insurance at standard rates because of a failure of the underwriting process.
Although the applicant would be pleased with this arrangement, the other policyholders would be most unhappy with this sequence of events. True, he seems at present in good health. Nevertheless, his unfavorable genetic test clearly identified a significantly increased risk. In addition, since his insurance coverage cannot be canceled once it has been purchased nor can the premium be increased relative to other policies issued to individuals with similar coverage, it is likely that he will be paid benefits from the pool that are disproportionate to the premiums he has paid.
Many people have come to expect that private life insurance and, to a greater extent, private health insurance, is an entitlement, i.e., that all citizens have a right to expect that affordable insurance protection will be made available to them regardless of age or health. This expectation is based, to a considerable degree, on misconceptions regarding the nature of private and public insurance programs. A brief discussion of these two different types of insurance will help to clarify their relationships.
Participation in a private commercial insurance plan typically is voluntary. You choose whether or not to belong and determine how much insurance protection you would like to purchase. Since all of the funds used to pay further claims against the insurance pool are derived either directly or indirectly from premium payments, risk classification is essential in order to ensure that the premium charged is proportionate to the risk assumed. The potential for adverse selection is very real and an important concern of the insurer. Moreover, private insurance companies are businesses that are accountable to their policyholders and stockholders. They must generate a profit for those who have invested in the company. If insufficient premiums are collected, a private insurance company, like any other business in which liabilities exceed assets, will cease to exist.
American society has used private means to fulfill certain general social welfare needs such as payment for health care. But private health insurance has never been a completely adequate or universal method of providing access to the health care system, nor has it been a perfect mechanism for covering all diseases. The poor, disabled, aged, or seriously ill cannot always be covered by private means. For this reason, society has supplemented private insurance with publicly supported programs such as Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare.
Participation in a public insurance plan is typically not voluntary. You do not choose whether or not to belong, nor do you determine how much insurance protection you will have. Rather, participation is mandatory, and benefit amounts or entitlements are determined by the law establishing the program.
Since everyone-good risks, poor risks, even those suffering from severe or terminal illness-is automatically insured and there are no options regarding the amount of benefits that will be paid, adverse selection is not a concern. Premiums are charged in the form of income and social security taxes, or so-called "insurance premiums," but they are not and need not be proportionate to the risk assumed. Risk selection is not required, and no profit motive exists.
Even given these fundamental differences between private commercial insurance and public insurance, couldn't legislators or regulators simply mandate that private insurers provide coverage-at rates appropriate for lower risks-to those individuals who have learned from their attending physicians or an insurer that a genetic test has identified a higher likelihood of premature death or illness? Or, in an action with the same consequences, couldn't insurers be prohibited from asking applicants and their attending physicians for the results of prior genetic tests or from ordering their own tests?
There seems little chance that this procedure would work in a private, voluntary insurance industry. Such mandated subsidization of unfavorable risks by good risks would be tantamount to an indirect governmental tax levied solely against insurance policyholders and stockholders. The effect of such an action might not appear significant at the outset, but its cumulative effects would be dramatic.
Under such a scenario, many potential policyholders-primarily favorable risks who would be asked to subsidize the higher, underpriced risks, and people with other health impairments such as cancer and heart disease who pay a premium commensurate with their increased risk-would realize that they are being overcharged or treated unfairly and would choose not to buy insurance because coverage has now become unaffordable for them.
Why? Wouldn't the premium increase be relatively small? Although such a plan for mandated benefits would probably not result in significantly higher costs at first, premiums would gradually and progressively rise as more and more favorable risks decided not to purchase insurance. As the relatively large base of good (standard) risks was progressively eroded, it would become increasingly difficult to subsidize the poorer risk, and premiums would increase again. The situation would worsen even more as some companies decide to stop writing this type of insurance coverage altogether since a profit can no longer be expected.
Such a legislative or regulatory mandate would force insurers to provide coverage for a large (because of the effects of adverse selection) group of people at a price that would be insufficient to cover the claims that would occur. These additional costs would be passed directly to other policyholders, with a subsequent decrease in insurance affordability and availability.
Insurers are strongly supportive of advances in genetic research that will one day lead to earlier treatment and/or prevention of disease, but they have no particular interest in nor enthusiasm for using genetic tests. Their current risk selection practices have generally been accepted by the medical community and the insurancebuying public. They have no desire to initiate new screening tests rife with uncertainty and controversy.
Nonetheless, at some point in the future, insurers may be forced to consider using genetic tests if that use becomes standard practice within the medical community. This action would be taken to enhance the risk selection process. Even more important, however, it might be necessary in order to provide some protection against the significant adverse selection that would otherwise be certain to occur.
At this time, insurers are no more able to answer the difficult questions concerning further use of genetic testing than is any other facet of society. In fact, most of the questions themselves are still unknown. We will continue to study the issues and to follow a reasonable course of action until significant technologic advances are made and the nature and use of genetic testing become more apparent.
